Christian Neuroscience Society

Left to its own devices, an atom cannot make a choice.⁴

The problems seem insurmountable. The new physics undoubtedly gives a new slant to the longstanding enigma of free will and determinism, but it does not solve it. The quantum theory undermines determinism, but brings its own crop of difficulties concerning freedom, not least of which is the possibility of multiple realities. The theory of relativity offers us a universe extended in time as well as space, but still leaves the door open for some sort of freedom of action.⁵

Frank Tipler

Frank J. Tipler, a mathematical physicist at Tulane University, tries to develop free will from quantum gravity uncertainties that, he claims, provide him with a true ontological randomizer. With this type of quantum uncertainty he feels that free will is an ontological possibility. With the conjecture that theoretical physics provides a basis for free will; and, since free will is necessary for religion, he argues that religion must ultimately dependent upon theoretical physics.

The evidence is clear and unequivocal: if scientists have no need for the God hypothesis, neither will anyone else. Were theologicians to succeed in their attempt to strictly separate science and religion, they would kill religion. Theology simply must become a branch of physics if it is to survive.⁶

This indeterminism is a property of all quantum cosmological theories for which the universal wave function includes in its domain the set of all compact four-dimensional manifolds. Thus, indeterminism holds both in the Hartle-Hawking quantum cosmology and in the quantum Omega Point Theory. However, it may be merely an epistemological, and not an ontological, indeterminism in the Hartle-Hawking cosmology.⁷

Although it has been shown that the human nervous system can use nonrelativistic quantum mechanical uncertainty to randomize, it does not follow that it can access the quantum gravity regime. As I pointed out above, true ontological free will requires quantum gravity uncertainty, because there is a deterministic equation controlling nonrelativistic "uncertainty." There are two ways in which the human nervous system might be able to access the quantum gravity regime in the randomization process. The first is a mechanism suggested by Penrose, who in effect points out that, if a substantial portion of the brain were to act as if it were in a coherent quantum state, it might be able to amplify a signal from the Planck scale up to the macroscopic level. The known amplification power of the nervous system —amplification of a single photon energy to nerve pulse energies constitutes a magnification of 10²⁰—is insufficient by a factor of 10⁸, so Penrose's proposal is speculative, to say the least. The second possibility is that the randomizer may use vacuum fluctuations inside the brain. A system which is capable of detecting single photons is certainly sensitive enough. One of the most important unsolved problems in particle physics is accounting for the magnitude of the vacuum energy density. If the fluctuations in topology are neglected, the calculated value is too high by a factor of about 10⁵⁴. The most popular method of resolving this problem is to include the topological fluctuations: some calculations indicate that these can cancel out the factor of 10⁵⁴. But if this is the cancellation mechanism, then the residual fluctuations in the vacuum energy density would necessarily reflect quantum gravity uncertainties, and thus a randomizer based on the fluctuations would be ontologically indeterministic. A state transition of the human brain in this case would be totally unpredictable. In this situation, we would have ontological free will.⁸

Along with Roger Penrose, Frank Tipler shows that the traditional Heisenberg's Principle of Uncertainty does not provide a basis for free will, since this type of uncertainty itself is determined by a fixed mathematical equation. Heisenberg's Principle of Uncertainty is expressed as follows.

Δ x Δ p ≥ h / 2p

The variables for the equation of an atomic particle are the position, "x," and its momentum, "p." The constant is Planck's constant, " h," times 1/2p. When the position of the particle becomes more certain, which is equivalent to saying that the Δx becomes smaller, then the uncertainty of the particle's momentum, Δp, becomes larger. Hence, some would argue that, because of the determinate mathematical nature of Heisenberg's Principle of Uncertainty, it would fail to provide the indeterminate freedom necessary for human free will.

Conclusion

Human free will decisions are self-determined decisions, and self-determined decisions are not indeterminate decisions.  Hence, it is a misguided adventure to search for an indeterminate randomizer to account for free-willed decisions. The reason for this is that free-willed decisions are not indeterminate decisions; they are self-determined decisions. The underlying assumption is that material causality must account for all human decisions. This may be stated in a syllogistic form,

Only material causality may be used to explain human choices.
Human choices appear to be non-determined.
Hence, there must be a material cause for the apparent non-determinacy of human choice.

However, if the initial premise were not granted, then the conclusion would not follow. For example, Mount Rushmore in South Dakota has images of several US presidents on it. Now, if only material causes were allowed to account for these images, then we would be limited to the material causality of wind, rain, sun, and temperature. But, if we don't limited ourselves to material causality, then we can consider the efficient causality of the artisan's choice to engrave the rock with the images of the various presidents.

Free Will and Reason

These theoretical physicists show a profound misunderstanding of what free will is. The human will is not a random action, dependent upon quantum uncertainty or a toss of a player's dice. It is the free choice of the human will, as it is determined by the intellect. It is a not a human will determined by the material causality of an instinctual nature. Rather, it is free (whence the term 'free' will) from material causality, and it finds its efficient causality in intellectual self-determination.

Brute animals have a will but it is not materially free, because they lack an immaterial intellect. On the other hand, man is endowed with an intellect, so man has a rational will. A mentally deranged person has a propensity to act indeterminately and randomly. But, the decisions of an irrational person are not the prototypical examples of the decisions of a person who is considered to be making free-willed decisions.

John of Damascus in his Exposition of the Orthodox Faith gave a standard definition of free will. Stones and bugs do not have an intellect; and, therefore, they do not have a free will. The will of man is not bound by matter nor cut off from reason; it was created in a more noble fashion than the lower creation. 

We hold, therefore, that free-will comes on the scene at the same moment as reason .... And if this is so, free-will must necessarily be very closely related to reason. For either man is an irrational being, or, if he is rational, he is master of his acts and endowed with free-will. Hence, also creatures without reason do not enjoy free-will: for nature leads them rather than they nature, and so they do not oppose the natural appetite, but as soon as their appetite longs after anything they rush headlong after it. But man, being rational, leads nature rather than nature him, and so when he desires aught he has the power to curb his appetite or to indulge as he pleases. Hence also creatures devoid of reason are the subjects neither of praise nor blame, while man is the subject of both praise and blame.⁹